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Over the past two decades, increasing concern and attention have been directed at the potential problems and threats associated with 
new and emerging diseases. This has been driven by 
fears arising from the rapid emergence, spread and 
public health impact of several recent outbreaks, such 
as the international spread of severe acute respiratory 
syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV) (2003), the potential 
of avian influenza H5N1 to emerge as a highly lethal 
pandemic as increasing numbers of human cases are 
reported (2003 and continuing), and the very rapid 
global spread of pandemic H1N1 influenza in 2009–
2010. The emergence of SARS-CoV, in particular, 
demonstrated the considerable economic, political and 
psychological effects–in addition to the impact on public 
health–of an unexpected epidemic of a highly infectious, 
previously unknown agent in a highly connected and 
interdependent world. These examples clearly highlight 
the necessity and importance of global outbreak 
surveillance for the early detection and response to new 
potential threats. They also demonstrate clearly that 
these emergent diseases can move rapidly between 
countries and continents through infected travellers so 
that surveillance needs to be transparent and authorities 
made aware of international disease events elsewhere 
around the globe. Some of the specific threats to the 
Asian Pacific region have been reviewed elsewhere.1–4
So what do we mean by the term “emerging 
diseases,” and how do they arise? The concept, definition 
and factors contributing to the emergence of disease 
threats were encapsulated in two reports from the US 
Institute of Medicine that defined the major issues and 
described the principal causes and mechanisms leading 
to infectious disease emergence, as well as discussing 
possible strategies for recognizing and counteracting the 
threats.5,6 The most widely accepted definition describes 
emerging diseases as either new, previously unrecognized 
diseases that are appearing for the first time, or diseases 
which are known but which are increasing in incidence 
and/or geographic range. Examples of the former include 
Sin Nombre virus, which first came to light in 1993 as 
the cause of Hantavirus pulmonary syndrome in the Four 
Corners area of the United States of America, and Nipah 
virus, which was first isolated in 1999 as a cause of acute 
neurological disease in peninsular Malaysia. Examples of 
the latter include West Nile virus, which unexpectedly 
jumped from the Old World to emerge in the New World 
in 1999, and Chikungunya virus, which, with the help 
of a mutation making it more able to be transmitted 
by Aedes albopictus mosquitoes, spread from island 
nations in the south-western Indian Ocean to India in 
2005–2006, and then jumped from south-western India 
to emerge in Italy in 2007. These examples re-enforce 
the importance of the movement of pathogens through 
either travel or trade (see below).
Many factors or combinations of factors contribute to 
disease emergence. They include population movements 
and the effect of urbanization; changes in land use such 
as deforestation and irrigated agriculture; increasing 
globalization of food, trade and commerce; increasing 
international travel; and changes in human behaviour 
such as intravenous drug use.7–9 The development 
of new, more sensitive technologies can also provide 
improved detection and diagnostic procedures allowing 
a new dimension to pathogen discovery, thus detecting 
new or cryptic agents for known diseases.10,11 Other 
factors that contribute to emergence are microbial 
mutation and selection and genetic re-assortment that 
can lead to the development of new genotypes of known 
diseases, as we see most frequently with influenza A and 
also in new patterns of antibiotic resistance. Finally, and 
sadly, known diseases can re-emerge if public health 
measures are reduced or decline because of complacency 
or apathy of individuals, communities or policy-makers, 
as exemplified by reduced vaccine coverage or childhood 
immunization programmes, or reduced vector control, or 
because of civil conflict. While all these factors described 
above are due to human activities, natural causes may 
also be important in emergence, such as climate change, 
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floods, drought, famine and other natural disasters, and 
thus should not be forgotten or discounted.
While all these factors have been implicated in 
disease emergence, the importance of the increase in 
international travel and the globalization of trade cannot 
be over-emphasized. This includes the movement of 
infectious agents between countries and continents and 
the transportation of vector species to establish in new 
habitats and ecological niches far from their origins, 
resulting in countries and areas becoming receptive 
to exotic diseases. Highly successful examples of this 
are the Asian tiger mosquito, Ae. albopictus, which 
has become established in one or more sites on all 
continents, and the spread of West Nile and Chikungunya 
viruses between continents. It is probable that West Nile 
reached the New World through the transport of an 
infected mosquito on an aircraft to initiate the outbreak. 
Chikungunya may have been transported by a similar 
route or through viraemic travellers to India and Italy, 
but its ability to cause an outbreak in Italy was due to 
the earlier arrival and establishment of Ae. albopictus 
mosquitoes, probably transported to their new habitat 
through the medium of used car tyres on board cargo 
vessels.
At least four different patterns of disease emergence 
can be distinguished:
(1) new infectious agents as the etiological agents 
of known diseases, often detected because of 
the development of more sensitive techniques 
for detection, exemplified by the first description 
of human herpesvirus 8, the virus associated 
with Kaposi’s sarcoma,12 of human coronavirus 
NL63,13 a new respiratory pathogen, and of 
Klassevirus 1,14 a new agent causing childhood 
diarrhoea;
(2) known-agents of diseases that are increasing 
in incidence and/or geographic distribution, 
as seen with the spread of dengue, Japanese 
encephalitis and West Nile viruses;15
(3) new patterns of disease epidemiology or 
pathogenesis due to mutation or genetic 
reassortment, as exemplified by the generation 
of new strains of avian influenza,16 and the 
severity of new genotypes of enterovirus 71 in 
the Asia-Pacific region;17 and
(4) novel infectious agents as the cause of 
outbreaks/epidemics of new disease syndromes, 
as exemplified by SARS-CoV18 and Nipah 
viruses,19 neither of which had been observed 
previously.
Over the past two decades, approximately 75% 
of novel viruses have been zoonoses, with new viruses 
arising from ecological niches in wildlife and domestic 
animal populations. Indeed most of the diseases with 
pandemic potential fall into this category. Some examples 
of these are shown in Table 1, which also demonstrates 
that emerging diseases may arise anywhere in the world. 
Table 1. Examples of novel, emergent zoonotic virus diseases
Year of isolation Place of isolation Virus Reservoir/spillover host
1991 Venezuela Guanarito virus20 Rodents
1992 Slovenia Dobrava virus21 Rodents
1993 United States Sin Nombre virus22 Rodents (Peromyscus maniculatus)
1994 Brisbane, Australia Hendra virus23 Fruit bats (Pteropus sp.)/horses*
Sao Paolo, Brazil Sabia virus24 Rodents
1995 Florida, USA Black Creek Canal virus25 Rodents
1996 Ballina, Australia Australian bat lyssavirus26 Fruit and insectivorous bats
Argentina Andes virus27 Rodents
1997 Hong Kong (China) Infl uenza H5N128 Wild birds/domestic poultry*
Menangle, Australia Menangle virus29 Fruit bats
Saudi Arabia Alkhurma virus30,31 Camels and sheep†
1999 Peninsular Malaysia Nipah virus32,33 Fruit bats/pigs*
2000 Peninsular Malaysia Tioman virus34 Fruit bats
2002–2003 China, Hong Kong (China) SARS coronovirus35-38 Bats/civets?*
2003–2004 Viet Nam, China Infl uenza H5N139,40 Wild birds/domestic poultry*
2007 Melbourne, Australia Dandenong arenavirus41 Rodents?
Peninsular Malaysia Melaka virus42 Fruit bats?
Uganda Bundibugyo ebolavirus43 Fruit bats?/various animals (bush meat)*
2008 Lukasa, Zambia Lujo virus44 Unidentifi ed rodents
Perak, Malaysia Kampar virus45 Fruit bats?
* Spillover host; † Tick-borne
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It is important to understand that although a disease 
may be new to us, it probably has been circulating in 
its own specific niche for a long time; we just haven’t 
encountered it before. There have been many reports of 
zoonotic viruses described in wildlife, especially bats46,47 
and rodents.48,49 In addition, many other viruses and 
other microbial agents have been described from wildlife 
in various parts of the world which have not yet been 
associated with human disease. Thus global surveillance 
for outbreaks of human diseases alone is insufficient to 
prepare for all eventualities, and a close watch needs 
to be maintained on animal diseases, in both domestic 
animals and wildlife. This need has given rise, in part, 
to the more holistic approach to surveillance, the 
concept of One Health,50,51 in which close collaboration 
is strongly endorsed between human and veterinary 
medicine through which integrated surveillance should 
be a major goal.
Not all countries have the epidemiological or 
laboratory resources, or the public health infrastructure, 
to respond effectively to outbreaks of infectious diseases. 
For those countries and areas that seek assistance in 
verification and/or in response and control, the World 
Health Organization can act, in collaboration with a 
broad range of partner institutions around the world, 
together forming the Global Outbreak Alert and Response 
Network (GOARN), to mount rapid assistance through 
the provision of expertise and specific resources.
With the advent of the new International Health 
Regulations (IHR) (2005), there is a strong call for 
accountability in reporting possible new outbreaks with 
a potential for international spread. The purpose of the 
IHR (2005) is “to prevent, to protect against, control, 
and provide a public health response to the international 
spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with 
and restricted to public health risks, and which avoid 
unnecessary interference with international traffic and 
trade” (Article 2).52 The accountability is linked to 
the national or local ability to detect and identify the 
etiology of possible risks to public health. There is a 
call to strengthen national capacity for surveillance 
and response and a requirement to alert the World 
Health Organization to any public health emergency of 
international concern. It is hoped that rapid, transparent 
surveillance procedures will provide an early global alert 
system to ensure that new outbreaks with a potential 
for international spread can be identified and controlled.
To ensure that countries have the core capacities to 
undertake effective preparedness planning, prevention, 
prompt detection, characterization, containment and 
control of emerging infectious diseases which could 
threaten national, regional and global security, the Western 
Pacific and South-East Asia Regional Offices of the World 
Health Organization developed The Asia Pacific Strategy 
for Emerging Diseases (APSED) as a road map to assist 
countries in their core capacity building.53 Considerable 
progress has been made towards strengthening the 
core capacities needed to prevent, detect and respond 
to threats posed by emerging diseases in both regions, 
and a new five-year plan has been approved to continue 
the building of core capacity, especially with respect 
to reducing the risk through strengthening surveillance 
and thus providing early detection and rapid response to 
public health emergencies.
Surveillance, early detection and rapid response are 
certainly the keys to reducing the risks from emerging 
diseases. To achieve this, there is no doubt that the IHR 
(2005) will provide the scope and blueprint, but the 
pathways will require improved surveillance through a 
One Health collaboration and continued core capacity-
building in epidemiology, laboratory capability, and other 
response components through the APSED workplan. 
However, to achieve a high level of surveillance 
and an ability to respond rapidly and effectively to 
infectious disease threats also requires a strong political 
commitment by policy-makers and governments, and by 
a cadre of well-trained and committed health workers in 
relevant disciplines.
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